## AMENDMENT TO RULES COMMITTEE PRINT 117– 54

## OFFERED BY MR. GARCÍA OF ILLINOIS

Page 1262, after line 23, insert the following:

| 1  | SEC. | REVIEW OF IMF LOAN SURCHARGE POLICY.                  |
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| 2  |      | (a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds as follows:          |
| 3  |      | (1) The International Monetary Fund (in this          |
| 4  |      | section referred to as the "IMF") imposes a sur-      |
| 5  |      | charge, in addition to standard interest and service  |
| 6  |      | fees, of 200 basis points on outstanding credit pro-  |
| 7  |      | vided through its General Resources Account that      |
| 8  |      | exceeds 187.5 percent of the IMF country quota,       |
| 9  |      | and an additional 100 basis points if that credit has |
| 10 |      | been outstanding for over 36 or 51 months, depend-    |
| 11 |      | ing on the facility.                                  |
| 12 |      | (2) According to the IMF, "These level and            |
| 13 |      | time-based surcharges are intended to help mitigate   |
| 14 |      | credit risk by providing members with incentives to   |
| 15 |      | limit their demand for Fund assistance and encour-    |
| 16 |      | age timely repurchases while at the same time gen-    |
| 17 |      | erating income for the Fund to accumulate pre-        |
| 18 |      | cautionary balances.".                                |

| 1  | (3) According to a 2021 report by the Euro-           |
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| 2  | pean Network on Debt and Development, surcharges      |
| 3  | increase the average cost of borrowing from the IMF   |
| 4  | by over 64 percent for surcharged countries. Sur-     |
| 5  | charges increased Ukraine's borrowing costs on its    |
| 6  | IMF lending program by nearly 27 percent, Jor-        |
| 7  | dan's by 72 percent, and Egypt's by over 104 per-     |
| 8  | cent.   |
| 9  | (4) As a result of Russia's invasion, the World       |
| 10 | Bank predicts that Ukraine will experience an eco-    |
| 11 | nomic contraction of 45 percent in 2022. Yet          |
| 12 | Ukraine is expected to pay the IMF an estimated       |
| 13 | \$483,000,000 in surcharges from 2021 through         |
| 14 | 2027.   |
| 15 | (5) The Ukraine Comprehensive Debt Payment            |
| 16 | Relief Act of 2022 (H.R.7081), which requires the     |
| 17 | Department of Treasury to make efforts to secure      |
| 18 | debt relief for Ukraine, was passed by the House of   |
| 19 | Representatives on May 11, 2022, with over-           |
| 20 | whelming bipartisan support, by a vote of 362 Yeas    |
| 21 | to 56 Nays.   |
| 22 | (6) As a result of the war in Ukraine and other       |
| 23 | factors, the World Bank predicted that global         |
| 24 | growth rates will slow to 2.9 percent in 2022, down   |
| 25 | nearly half from 2021. External public debt of devel- |

1 oping economies is at record levels, and the World 2 Bank, IMF, and United Nations have all warned of 3 coming defaults and a potential global debt crisis. As food and energy prices rise, the World Food Pro-5 gram has estimated that 750,000 people are at im-6 mediate risk of starvation death, or7 323,000,000 people may experience acute food inse-8 curity before the end of the year. 9 (7) Since 2020, the number of countries paying 10 surcharges to the IMF has increased from 9 to 16. 11 A December 2021 IMF policy paper, notes that 12 under the IMF's model-based World Economic Outlook scenario "the number of surcharge-paving 13 members would increase to 38 in FY 2024 and FY 14 15 2025" and that under the Fund's "adverse scenario, 16 the number of surcharge-paying members and the 17 amount of surcharge income would increase even 18 more sharply". 19 (8) An April 2022 brief from the United Na-20 tions Global Crisis Response Group on Food, Energy 21 and Finance on the impacts of the war in Ukraine 22 on developing countries called for the immediate sus-23 pension of surcharge payments for a minimum of 2 24 years, because "[s]urcharges do not make sense dur-25 ing a global crisis since the need for more financing

| 1  | does not stem from national conditions but from the        |
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| 2  | global economy shock''.                                    |
| 3  | (b) REVIEW OF SURCHARGE POLICY AT THE INTER-               |
| 4  | NATIONAL MONETARY FUND.—The Secretary of the               |
| 5  | Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Direc- |
| 6  | tor at the International Monetary Fund to use the voice    |
| 7  | and vote of the United States to—                          |
| 8  | (1) initiate an immediate review by the IMF of             |
| 9  | the surcharge policy of the IMF to be completed,           |
| 10 | and its results and underlying data published, within      |
| 11 | 365 days; and  |
| 12 | (2) suspend and waive surcharge payments dur-              |
| 13 | ing the pendency of the review.                            |
| 14 | (c) Components of the Review of Surcharge                  |
| 15 | Policy.—The review referred to in subsection (b) shall     |
| 16 | include the following:                                     |
| 17 | (1) A borrower-by-borrower analysis of sur-                |
| 18 | charges in terms of cost and as a percentage of na-        |
| 19 | tional spending on debt service on IMF loans, food         |
| 20 | security, and health for the 5-year period beginning       |
| 21 | at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.                     |
| 22 | (2) Evaluation of the policy's direct impact               |
| 23 | on—  |
| 24 | (A) disincentivizing large and prolonged re-               |
| 25 | liance on Fund credit;                                     |

| 1  | (B) mitigating the credit risks taken by              |
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| 2  | the IMF;  |
| 3  | (C) improving borrower balance of pay-                |
| 4  | ments and debt sustainability, particularly dur-      |
| 5  | ing periods of contraction, unrest, and pan-          |
| 6  | demic;  |
| 7  | (D) promoting fiscally responsible policy             |
| 8  | reforms;  |
| 9  | (E) disincentivizing borrowers from seek-             |
| 10 | ing opaque and potentially predatory bilateral        |
| 11 | loans; and  |
| 12 | (F) improving the ability of borrowers to             |
| 13 | repay private creditors and access the private        |
| 14 | credit market.  |
| 15 | (3) Recommendations for—                              |
| 16 | (A) Identifying alternative sources of fund-          |
| 17 | ing for the IMF's precautionary balances that         |
| 18 | prioritize stable funding sources and equitable       |
| 19 | burden-sharing among IMF members;                     |
| 20 | (B) Determining whether the Fund should               |
| 21 | maintain, reform, temporarily suspend or elimi-       |
| 22 | nate the use of surcharges.                           |
| 23 | (4) The review process must incorporate exten-        |
| 24 | sive consultation with relevant experts, particularly |
| 25 | those from countries that are currently paying or     |

have recently paid surcharges. These experts should include government officials responsible for overseeing economic development, social services, and defense, United Nations officials, economic research institutes, academics, and civil society organizations.

